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tween the parties. Blossom vs. Griffln, 3 Kern. 569. So. also
circumstances attending the execution of an instrument may be
resorted to as an aid in the interpretation of its language.
4. The only remaining inquiry we shall make relates to usage
or custom, and this is introduced not with a view to contradict the
terms of a contract, but to interpret and explain them. The Queen
vs. Inhabitants of Trent, 5 Adolph. & Ellis303. The only pur)ose for which usage or custom is admissible is to determine the
'eal intentions and understanding of the parties where they are
:ot determined by the actual terms of the contract. But it can
.everbe admitted to contradict or supersede the positive and definite
)rovisions of a contract, because the entering into such provisions
s regarded as evidence of an intention to overrule all usage or
iustom which conflict with their terms. There are certain limita.-ions, however, to the introduction of usage or custom. These
grow mostly out of its nature or character. No usage inconsistent
%viththe principles of law, or which would defeat the essential provisions of the contract, or which is narrow, local, or confined, or
existing only in the private opinion of a few, can be introduced to
modify or explain the terms of an agreement. Rogers vs. Mechanics' Fire Ins. Co., 1 Story 606. The usage should either be
brought home to the knowledge of the other party, or be so
genera] as to justify a presumption of such knowledge.
A. D.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

Circuit Court United States, 3fassachusetts -District. Oct6ber
Term, 1862.-In Admiralty.
HENRY A. PIERCE, LIBELLANT, VS. NATHANIEL AVINSOR, JR., ET AL.
.IN.stic s.ipped illbulk on a vessel chartered for California, in the course of the

voyage inehed and afrtrwar',ls set. as it was naturally liable to do when exposed
to great I .. ua. and thereby oceca-inel serious injury to other 1,nrts of the
cargo The .qhippcrs of the latter, by reason tbere,, recovered d1anuages
against the owners of the vessel, in actions on bills of lading signed by the
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master, who had been appointed by the owners of the vesseL The dangerous
character of mastic was not known to either party at the time of its shipment,
and had in fact been frequently shipped on shorter voyages without injurious
consequences. Held that the owners of the vessel were entitled to recover on a
libel in admiralty against the charterers, the amount of damages which they had
been obliged to pay.

Opinion delivered by Mr. Justice CLIFF OD.
This is an appeal in admiralty from a decree of the District
Court of the United States for this district, in a cause of contract,
civil and maritime. The libellant was the owner of the ship Golden
City, and the respondents were the charterers for a voyage from
Boston to San Francisco. Charter-party bears date on the 4th
day of May, 1858, and the libel was filed on the 10th day of
November, 1859. The respondents chartered the whole ship, with
the usual exception of the cabin and necessary room for the accommodation of the crew and the stowage of the sails, cables,
and provisions; and the stipulation was that the ship should be at
the sole use and disposal of her charterers for the voyage, and that
no goods or merchandise should be laden on board otherwise than
from the charterers or their agent. The owners engaged to make
necessary repairs, man, and victual the ship, and take and. receive
on board the vessel during the voyage all such lawful goods and
merchandise as the charterers or their agent might think proper to
ship. Among other things the libellant alleged thht the respondents, as the charterers of the ship, while she was lying at New
York, delivered or caused to be delivered on board the ship to the
master, to be carried to Boston, and thence to San Francisco, on
the voyage under the charter-party, one thousaind and four cakes
of an article called mastic; that the article is composed of bitumen
and Earthy matter, and at a certain degree of heat will soften and
melt, and will then set so as to become very hard and flinty; that
on a-voyage such as that from Boston to San Francisco the tendency on that behalf is so great that, unless the article is properly
and skilfully packed, the cakes are liable to melt and run together,
and among the other goods stowed in contact with the same, and
to diffuse itself in the hold of the ship, and then to set and harden
so as to injure and destroy the other goods, and to cause great and
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unusual expense in discharging the other goods and the mastic out
of the ship ; that the article was then new in commerce, and that
the effect of a voyage upon it was unknown to the master and to
the libellant; that the respondents did not give to the master or to
the libellant any notice of the character of the article or of its
liability or tendency to melt and do damage as aforesaid, and that
neither the master or himself had any knowledge or means of
knowledge upon the subject, or that the mastic might not properly
be stowed in the way that goods are usually stowed for such
voyages; and he also alleged that the mastic did soften and melt
on the voyage, and that the cakes did run together and among the
other goods placed in contact with the mastic, diffusing itself in
the hold of the ship, and did then set and became hard and flinty,
whereby the goods were injured and destroyed, and the libellant
was compelled under the bills of lading to make good the loss and
damage, and was put to additional expense in discharging the
goods and freeing the ship of the mastic.
Most of the material allegations of the libel are denied, in the
answer. The respondents deny that the mastic was a new article
of commerce, or that they were bound to ascertain any further respecting the mastic, or give any notice to the libellant as to its
character or the manner in which it should be stowed, or that they
were in that particular or in any other respect at fault in the premises, as alleged by the libellant. Lawful goods and merchandise
they had a right to ship ; and they allege that the mastic was such
under the charter-party, and that they shipped the same without
any fault, and that the same was received by the consignees, paying freight on the same, and that the mastic was put to the purposes for which it was designed, and consequently they allege that
if the libellant was put to any expense, or suffered any damage, it
was through his own fault, and that of his agents. Both parties
took testimony in the District Court, and, after the hearing, the
Court entered a decree in favor'of the libellant, and the respondents
appealed to this Court. The mastic, as alleged, was shipped by
the Government of the United States from their works at New
York to the fortification at Fort Point in San Francisco. When
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delivered on board it was in cakes, and was stowed in bulk in the
run. Upon the arrival of the ship at the port of destination, it
was found that the mastic had melted on the voyage, and that the
cakes had run together and among the cargo stowed in contact
with if, and had been hardened as alleged in the libel, and in that
state was adhering to the sides of the ship and to certain portions
of the cargo. The amount of damage done to the cargo, which
was paid by the master on account of the ship, including the extra
expense in discharging the mastic, exceeded nineteen hundred dollars. Two other ships, the Dashaway and the Fleetwing, which
sailed shortly after the Golden City, also had mastic on board,
shipped in the same way, and the proofs show that when the vessels
arrived out it was in the same condition. These cargoes, with one
shipped in casks at a later period, and after the facts respecting
the earlier shipments had become known, were all the cargoes, so
far as known, ever shipped by the United States to San Francisco
or on any long voyage. Such mastic is manufactured by the
government at New York, and is used on fortifications, and has
been repeatedly shipped to the various forts on the Atlantic coast
and in the Gulf, and had always been shipped in bulk without its
being known that it was liable to be so affected by the heat in the
hold of the vessel. Suit was brought by the owners of the vessel
against the charterers to recover the damage and expense as
already explained. The libellant does not allege or prove that the
respondents had any knowledge of the dangerous character of the
article, but he claims to recover upon the ground that there is
always an implied contract on the part of the charterer or general
shipper of merchandise that the goods shipped shall not be of a
character dangerous to the ship or the rest of the cargo, and that
the want of knowledge of the true character of the article will not
release such charterer or shipper from the responsibility which the
law imposes upon him as incidental to his contract. Two propositions may be assumed as beyond dispute. First, that the case is
not one of inevitable accident; and secondly, that the owner of the
ship is without any actual fault arising out of any act of his own
or that of the master or his agents. Inevitable accident is not
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pretended ; and, if the pretence were set up, it could not be supported for a moment. Union Steamship Co. vs. Y,' York and
Virginia Steamshiy Co., 24 How. 31".
Some attempt was made
to impute fault to the owner of the vessel because she was delayed
in Boston for the purpose of repairs, but the explanations are
satisfactory and the position wholly unsustained. Neither party
had any knowledge of the dangerous character of the article, so
that it may be said that there was no actual fault on either side,
except such, if any, as the law implied from the nature of the
transaction. The charterers put up the ship as a general ship,
and under the terms of the charter-party the ship was at their sole
use and disposal to ship such lawful goods as they might think
proper, and it was expressly stipulated that their stevedore should
be employed by the owner in Boston. The stowage of the mastic
was made in the usual way, and it is not denied that it would have
been proper if the article had been what it was supposed to be
when it was received aid put on board. Want of greater care in
that behalf is not a fault, because the master had no knowledge or
means of knowledge that the article required any extra care or
attention beyond what is usual in respect to other goods. Proper
precautions in respect to the packing therefore had been taken if
the goods had not been of dangerous character, which was wholly
unknown to the master or the owner of the ship, or his agents.
But damage was occasioned, and loss and expense were incurred,
and the only question is who must suffer. ""here the owners of a
general ship undertook that they would receive the goods and
safely carry and deliver them at her destined port, it was held in
Brass vs. Maitland, 6 Ell. & Black. 481, that the shippers undertook that they would not deliver, to be carried in the voyage,
packages of goods of a dangerous nature, which those employed on
behalf of the shipowner might not on inspection be reasonably expected to know to be of a dangerous nature, without expressly
giving rictice that they were of a dangerous nature. Such was the
principle laid down in that case, but the reasoning of the Court in
support of the rule is even more applicable to the present case.
Although those employed on behalf of the shipowner have no rea-
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sonable means during the loading of a general ship to ascertain the
quality of the goods offered -for shipment, or narrowly to examine
the sufficiency of the packing of the goods, the shippers, says Lord
CAMPBELL, have such means, and it seems more just and expedient
that, although they were ignorant of the dangerous quality of the
goods or the insufficiency of the packing, the loss occasioned
thereby should be cast upon the shipper rather than upon the shipowners. Accordingly he held that the shippers, and not the shipowner, must suffer, if from the ignorance of the former a notice
was not given to the latter which they were entitled to receive, and
from the want of notice a loss had arisen which must fall on either
the shipper or the owner of the vessel. Undoubtedly that rule, as
is well contended by the libellant, rests upon the same principle
as that which is applied in other commercial transactions of an
analogous character. Where damage is sustained in a case not
falling within the category of an inevitable accident, and neither
party is in actual fault, the loss shall fall on him who from the relation he bears to the transaction is supposed to be possessed of
the necessary knowledge to have avoided the difficulty. Baron
PARKE applied that rule in the case of Gibson vs. Small, 24 Eng.
L. & Eq. 40, with great force and rigor in the case of a voyage
policy, holding that the law did not regard exceptional cases, but
wisely laid down a general rule, which is a most reaionable one in
the vast majority of voyage policies, that the assured implicitly
contracted to do that which he ought to do before the commencement of the voyage. Judge SPRAGUE approved the rule upon the
ground that it ordained that the loss should fall up.on the party
who generally had the best means of informing himself as to the
character of the article to be shipped, which undoubtedly is the
foundation principle on which the liability rests. Were the rule
otherwise it might, as was well said by the district Judge, encourage negligence, and even induce the general shipper or charterer to try experiments with articles unknown to commerce at
the expense of the shipowner. In view of the whole case I am of
the opinion that there is no error in the record.
The decree of the District Court is accordingly affirmed
with costs.

PIERCE vs. WL1SOR.
!.)r the foregoing very able and interesting opinion we are indebted to the
courtesy of Mr. Justice CLIFFORD. The
subject is not one which we have before
h1d occasion to examine, and we infer,
ft'om the paucity of references to-other
cises. both here and in the case of Brass
- Maitlpnd, 36 Eng. L. & Eq. R. 221,
where the matter is very extensively
discussed, both at the bar and upon the
bench,

CROMPTOx, J., dissenting, that

the question has but seldom arisen upon
the direct point here ruled. It must
th-reforo be settled by the application
of the nearest analogies. And in this
view it seems to us not entirely free
from doubt.
It seems clearly settled that to the
extent of the shipper's knowledge lie is
clearly bound to disclose any and all
grounds of apprehension, belief, or suspicion, of any dangerous character in
Ihe articles shipped. The omission to do
so would be clearly fraud, as has often
been held in regard to common carriers.
lutchinson vs. Guion, 5 C. B. N. S. 149;
Hudson vs. Baxendale, 2 IL & N. 575;
Redfield on Railw. 303, and cases cited.
And in this case, where the defect is
latent .a d equally unknown to both
partie. :he loss must of necessity, so far
as the goods are concerned, fall upon
the owner. Btit beyond that, where loss
and injury occurs to the shipowner or
carrier, through some defect in the article equally unknown to both parties,
and where it is the result, not of any
defective quality, either in the article
or the package, but results solely from
the effect of change of temperature necessarily incident to the voyage, which
was equally open to the observation of
both parties and which might have been
anticipated by both, but for inattention
or want of experience, it seems to us
there may be some ground to question,
whether the loss incident to the transVoc. XI-10

action must not fall upon both parties.
in proportion as they have been injured.
by what, to them, must be regarded as
an accidental result. This is clearly so
in regard to property under lease, where
no special stipulations are made. If the
property, be it real or personal, is destroyed, or rendered unfit for the use
of the lessee, without the fault of either
party, the loss for the term falls upon
'the lessee and for the remainder upon
the lessor.
But we have been struck with the
force of the suggestion that, as a rule
of policy, it is better the loss in cases
like the present should fall exclusively
upon the shipper. It is clear where the
contract, or charter-party, contains any
stipulation as to the quality, state, or
lawfulness of the goods to be shipped
by the charterer, he thereby assumes
all risk in regard to those matters.
And the unquestionable tendency of
the more recent decisions is towards
making the party upon whom the selection of goods is devolved, either by
the terms of the contract, or the relation
of the parties, responsible by way of an
implied contract for all latent defects in
them, that is for all defects equally unknown to both parties. This question,
in regard to the implied warranty of the
fitness of particular goods for any given
purpose, is lucidly and, as it seems to
us, very satisfactorily discussed, in the
Exchequer Chamber in the recent case
of Bigge vs. Parkinson, 8 Jur. N. S.
1014 (1862), by the Lord Chief Justice
of the Queen's Bench. His Lordship
thus defines the rule: "Where a buyer
buys a specific article, caveat emptor applies; but where the buyer orders goods
to be supplied, and trusts to the seller's
judgment to select the goods for the
purpose to which they were to be applied, and which both parties knew they
were to be applied to, then, though
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there is no express stipulation that they

and unreasonable application of the

shall be fit for that purpose, there is an

maxim caveat emytor, is in

implied warranty that they shall be fit."

direction.

This is certainly a very equitable and
just principle, and one which is quite
susceptible of controlling the present
case, without any unreasonable extension. We believe the tendency of modem decisions, in regard to the harsh

with the decision of Mr. Justice CLIFFon in the principal case. We only
wish to have it brought to the decision
of the full bench. Our doubts do not
extend beyond that.
I. F. R.

the right

We therefore coincide fully

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
CHASE Vs.

MILLER.

Contested ETection-Constitutionalityof Military Vote outside of
State.
1. This Court has jurisdiction to review and correct the proceedings of inferior
Courts, except where it is expressly excluded by statute, or in a case stated by
the parties, wherein they agree to submit their disputes to auditors or referees
of the Common Pleas without expressly reserving their right to a writ of error.
The presumption in the latter case is, that the parties mean to bind themselves
by the award of the domestic tribunal of their own choice.
2. This Court has jurisdiction of a contested election, on certiorari,where it appears
from the record that no facts were in dispute; hence the rulings of the Curt
here.
below upon questions of law purely are reviewable
3. This Court is as much bound to take cognisance of questions involving the
constitutionality of the election laws, even though they may be raised in a
contested election, as they are to pass upon the constitutionality of an Act of
Assembly relating to any other subject, as long as the Legislature does not tako
away that jurisdiction.
4. The 155th section of the Act of 2d July, 1839, giving to Courts of Quarter Sessions the same powers that are conferred on committees of the Legislature, to
compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of papers in contested
elections, is only a grant of power for the specific purposes named, and does not
make the decision of the Court below, like that of the Legislature, final and
conclusive.
5. Bills of exceptions are not allowed in the Courts of Quarter Sessions, therefore
no question which arises outside of the record can be reviewed by this Court.
6 Election districts, within the meaning of our statute, denotes subdivisions of
Pennsylvania territory, marked out by known boundaries, prearranged and
declared by public authorities; and election districts mean in the Constitution
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gust what iby mean in thc statute. The Constitution recognises them as among
the civil institutions of the State, which can neither be created, nor controlled
by the military power.
7. The term "residence" in the Constitution is the same as domicil-a word which
means the place where a man establishes his abode, makes the seat of his property, and exercises his civil and political rights.
8. The right of a soldier to vote, under the Constitution, is in the district where
he resided at the time of his entering the military service.
9. The 4.3d section of the election law of 2d July, 1839, allowing soldiers to vote
outside of the boundaries of the State, is in direct conflict with the amended
clause of the 3d article of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, and is, therefore,
null and void.

Appeal from and certiorarito the Quarter Sessions of Luzerne
County.
A complaint of upwards of twenty qualified electors of Luzerne
county, setting forth an undue election and false return of Ezra B.
Chase to the office of District Attorney of said county, was filed
29th November, 1861.
On December 24, 1861, an agreement between the parties as to
the facts to be submitted as a case stated, was filed. This agreement submits the question of the constitutionality of an Act of
Assembly of Pennsylvania, allowing volunteers in military service
to vote wherever they may be on the day of election, and the commanding officers to transmit their return of votes, tickets, &c., to
their respective counties to be counted in the general return. The
facts of the case appear at large in the opinion of the Supreme
Court. The Court below decided in favor of the constitutionality
of the military vote, and decreed accordingly.
The case was argued on behalf of the appellant by iessrs.
Stanley Woodward, and Lyman Bakes, -who cited Sect. 1, Art.
3, of the Constitution of Pennsylvania; McDaniel's Case, 4 Penn.
L. Jour. 312; Cooper vs. Gilbraith, 3 W. C. C. R. 546; Story's
Confl. Laws 50, 51; Kent's Com. 431, note E.; 1 Bouv. Inst. 96, 99;
Guier vs. O'Daniel, I Binn. 352; U. S. vs. Penelope, 2 Peters'
Adm. 450; 9 Deb. Penna. Const. 300. The Constitution requires
a residence of ten days immediately preceding the election In the
election district. This restriction is to be strictly construed. Thu
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Legislature have no power to modify a constitutional restrictiotl
upon the voting privilege.
Messrs. S. P. Longstreet and G. M. Wharton, for appellees,
cited Overseers vs. Brown, 1 Harris 390; Canal Co. vs. Keiser, 7
Harris 134; Carpenter's Case, 2 Harris 486; Commonwealth vs.
Nathans, 5 Barr 124; Wallington vs. Kneass, 3 Harris 313, 7
Watts 527; Mifflin Township vs. -lizabeth, 6 Harris 17; Commonwealth vs. Clarke, 7 W. & S. 127; Act of 26 April, 1844; Commonwealth vs. Hfartman, 5 Harris 119; Commonwealth vs. Me Williams, 1 Jones 70; Commonwealth vs. Maxwell, 3 Casey 458;
R. B. Co. vs. Casey, 2 Casey 300; Kilpatrick vs. Commonwealth,
7 Casey 215; Bank of Kentucky vs. Schuylkill Bank, 1 Parsons
223. A constitution is not to receive a technical but a liberal construction. There is nothing in the Constitution to prevent the
Legislature from establishing for the convenience of the people,
different places to receive votes for the same election district; nor
is there anything to prevent their establishing, for the convenience
of the voters of a district, a place outside of the district for holding
the election. Express prohibition is necessary to oust the authority
of the Legislature.
The opinion of the Court was delivered May 22d, 1862, by
J.-This is a case of contested election. It comes
up to us by writ of certiorari. A motion was made and fully
argued, to quash the writ on the ground that the decree of the
Court below is final and, conclusive, and that we have no jurisdiction to review it. The first point to be considered, therefore, is
our jurisdiction; for if there be any doubt on that head, we shall
be more than willing to escape the constitutional question upon the
record.
[A portion of the opinion, not referring to the main question of
constitutionality, is omitted, on account of the extreme length of
the case.]
An election for District Attorney was held in Luzerne county,
last October, at which Ezra B. Chase and Jerome G. Miller were
the candidates. After counting what the return judges considered
WOODWARD,
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"legal votes, they gave their certificate of election to Chase, but
twenty qualified electors filed their complaint in writing, setting
forth an undue election, and a false return of Chase, and thus this
contest was inaugurated. Besides complaining of a large number
of fraudulent votes cast within the county, the petitioners set forth
that "on the day of election certain citizens .of the Commonwealth,
being qualified electors of the county of Luzerne, and then in the
actual military service in certain detachments or companies of volunteers, under a requisition from the President of the United States,
and by the authority of the Governor of the Comjmonwealth, did,
agreeably to law, hold an election for the purpose of electing county
officers of Luzerne ;'" and then follows a detailed statement of the
votes cast by different companies for the office of District Attorney,
and a complaint that the return judges excluded the vote of the
volunteers, and issued their certificate in disregard of it.
The petitioners did not give the names of the military voters,
nor tell the Court wher6 they voted. Exceptions were filed to the
complaint, one of which was that the place of voting was not disclosed, but the Court overruled the exceptions, and refused to quash
the complaint or compel it to be amended in this particular.
Pending the proceedings upon this petition, the parties, on the
24th of December, 1861, entered into, and, with the leave of the
Court, filed of record, a written agreement in these words:
"It is agreed the following facts be submitted as a case stated
for the Court's decision. Admitted that of the votes polled within
the county of Luzerne, Ezra B. Chase received 5811 votes, and
that Jerome G. Miller received 5646, and that the said number of
votes by each received be counted by the Court as legal votes.
That'of the votes polled by the volunteers in the army, Ezra B.
Chase received 58 votes, Jerome G. Miller received 862 votes. But
the legality of the votes polled by the volunteers in the army not
being admitted, the question as to the legal effect thereof is submitted as a matter of law for the Court. If the Court should be of
opinion that the army vote is constitutional and legal, the same to
be allowed by the Court, and added to the vote cast in the county
for the part-, or parties in whose favor they may be, and then the
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Court to decree in favor of the party having the greatest number
of votes. If no part of the army vote is received, the decree to be
in favor of Mr. Chase, the army vote being taken as above stated,
the objections to it being all waived, except as to its constitutionality."
On the 6th of January, the Court made their decree "upon the
written statement of facts agreed to by the parties, and filed upon
the 24th December ultimo, no other evidence being offered," which
was to the effect that the army vote was legal, that it should be
counted, and that it gave a majority to Miller, to whom the office
was awarded.
The "army vote," as it is most loosely called in the agreement of
24th December, was cast somewhere, and counted in ursuance of
section 43d and the sections immediately succeeding of the general
election law of 2d July, 1839, Purdon 289. The 43d section is in
these words:
"Whenever any of the citizens of this Commonwealth, qualified
as hereinbefore provided, shall be in any actual military service in
any detachment of the militia or corps of volunteers under a requisition from the President of the United States, or by the authority of
this Commonwealth, on the day of the general election, such citizens may exercise the right of suffrage at such place as may be
appointed by the commanding officer of the troop or company to
which they shall respectively belong, as fully as if they were present
at the usual place of election : 1Provided, That no member of any
such troop or company shall be permitted to vofe at the place so
appointed, if at the time of such election he shall be within ten
miles of the place at which he would be entitled to vote if not in
the service aforesaid."
This section and its sequents are virtually a reprint of the Act
of 29th March, 1813, 6 Smith's Laws, p. 7(Y. The proviso of that
Act prescribed two miles from his usual place of voting as the condition on which the volunteer in actual service might exercise
suffrage elsewhere. Such a proviso, whether two miles, as in the
Act of 1813, or ten miles, as in the Act of 1839, is an intimation
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of that which we have other reasons for believing, that the Legislature of neither of those years had any thought whatever of legalizing military voting outside of our own territorial limits. They
probably meant to give the citizen soldier who should he in actual
service within the State on the day of the general election, an
opportunity to vote, if his engagements detained him at the prescribed distance from his domicil. And so understood, there was
nothing in the State Constitution, when the Act of 1813 was passed,
which its terms could be thought to contravene. The Constitution
of 1790 was then in force, and the qualifications of an elector which
that instrument prescribed, were that he should be a freeman of the
age of twenty-one years; that he should have resided in the State
two years next before the election, and within that time paid a
State or county taxi which should have been assessed at least six
months before the election-or he should be a son, between twentyone and twenty-two years of age, of a citizen qualified as aforesaid.
This was the constitutibnal rule, and the whole of it, up to January 1, 1839, when the amended Constitution of 1838 took effect;
and, therefore, when the revisers of our civil code, who were very
competent constitutional lawyers, reported in 1834 a general election law, substantially the same that is now in force, they did not
hesitate to retain the substance of the Act of 1813. Had their
report been made after the Constitution of 1838, we would scarcely
have expected them to incorporate the provisions of the Act of
1813, for, as we shall see hereafter, the Constitution of 1838 made
the place of voting an element of suffrage.
For five years their report:was not taken up by the Legislature,
and when nedr the close of the long session of 1839, it came up,
the Legislature passed it pretty much in the wfords submitted by
the revisers, without adverting to the changes which in that interval of five years had taken place'in our fundamental law. We are
not to wonder at this, for instances of even more careless legislation
are not uncommon. The Act, a long one, made up of 13 7 sections,
was not touched until a late d.ay of* the session, and was adopted
by the two houses on the 25th June-the very day they adjourned.
It was signed by the Governor on t:,c 2d July, 1t.'. which gave
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the Act its date. If, in the hurry of closing a long session of the
Legislature, any one of the numerous provisions of the Act suggested
a cbnstitutional doubt to the mind of a single member, he doubtless
dismissed it upon faith in the revisers, without remembering that
he was called to consider a very different constitutional question
from any that engaged their attention. Tradition tells of no constitutional debates on the Act of 1839 in the Legislature that
passed it. I mention these circumstances as showing how inconclusive is the argument which the learned Judge below attempted
to deduce in favor of the constitutionality of the Act, from the high
character of the revisers and many of the members of the Legislature.
The great question now before us is, whether the 43d section of
the Act can be reconciled with the 1st section of article 3d of the
amended Constitution ? Having already quoted the 43d section, I
will bring into contrast with it the very terms of the constitutional
provision:
"In elections by the citizens, every white freeman of the age
of twenty-one years, having resided in the State one year, and in
the election district where he offers to vote ten days immediately
preceding such election, and within two years paid a State or
county tax, which shall have been assessed at least ten days before
the election, shall enjoy the rights of an elector. Biat a citizen of
the United States who had previously been a qualified voter in this
State, and removed therefrom and returned, and who shall have
resided in the election district and paid taxes as aforesaid, shall be
entitled to vote after residing in the State six mnonths: Provided,
That white freemen, citizens of the United States, between the ages
of twenty-one and twenty-two years, and having resided in the
State one year, and in the election district ten days, as aforesaid,
shall be entitled to vote, although they shall not have paid taxes."
By comparing this clause with the corresponding provision of the
Ojonstitution of 1790, it will be seen in what the amendments consisted. The word "white" was introduced before "freemen,"
excluding thereby negro suffrage, which had prevailed to a slight
extent. The State residence was reduced from two years to one,
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and the words requiring a residence in the election district where
he offers to vote, were added.
This latter amendment was probably suggested by the registry
law, which was passed in 1886, for the city and county of Philadelphia, the main object of which was to identify the legal voter
before the election came on, and to compel him to offer his vote in
his appropriate ward or township, and thereby to exclude disqualified pretenders and fraudulent voters of all sorts. The idea of 'a
registry of legal voters as means to purity of elections was hinted
by Chief Justice TILGHMAN in Catlin vs. Smith, 2 S. & R. 266.
When the third article came up in the Convention of 1838 the political party who had favored the Philadelphia registry law, brought
forward and supported this amendment as calculated to accomplish
substantially the same results for the whole State which the registry law proposed to accomplish for Philadelphia. The political
party to whom the registry law had always been distasteful, opposed
the amendment as an -unnecessary clog upon freedom of suffrage,
but on a division it was adopted by a vote of sixty-four to sixty,
every member from the city of Philadelphia, where the registry law
had proved acceptable, voting for it, and every member from the
county of Philadelphia, which had never relished the registry law,
voting against the amendment: Con. Deb. vol. ix., p. 300, et seq.
Regarding the amendment as designed in general to exclude
fraudulent voting, the question now is, what construction shall be
given to its .particular phraseology? Construing the words accordin,to their plain and literal import (and we must presume that the
people of Pennsylvania construed them so when' they adopted the
amendment), they mean, undoubtedly', that 6h'Citizen possessing
the other requisite qualifications is'to'have a ten days' "residence in
an election district, and is to offer his ballot in that district The
second section of this article requires all popular elections to be by
ballot. To "offer to vote" by ballot, is to present oneself, with
proper qualifications, at the time and place appointed, and to make
manual delivery of the ballot to the officers appointed by law to
receive it. The ballot cannot be sent by mail or express, nor can
it be cast outside of all Pennsylvania election districts and certified
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into the county where the voter has his domicil. We cannot be
persuaded that the Constitution ever contemplated any such mode
of voting, and we have abundant reason for thinking that to permit
it would break down all the safeguards of honest suffrage. "The
Constitution meint, rather, that the voter, in propria persona,

should offer his vote in an appropriate election district, in order
that his neighbors might be at hand to establish his right to vote
if it were challenged, or to challenge if it were doubtful.
The amendment so understood, introduced not only a new test
of the right of suffrage, to wit, a district residence, but a rule of
voting also. Place became an element of suffrage for a two-fold
purpose. Without the district residence no man shall vote, but
having had the district residence, the right it confers is to vote in
that district. Such is the voice of the Constitution. The test and
the rule are equally obligatory. We have no power to dispense
with either. Whoever would claim the franchise which the Constitution grants, must exercise it in the manner the Constitution
prescribes.
But, be it observed, the Constitution does not define an election
district, and therefore I hold that it referred the definition to the
legislature. The words "election district," do not occur in the
Constitution of 1790. The word "district" was often applied by
that instrument to subdivisions of the State for sendtorial, representative, and judicial purposes, but never for purposes of general
elections. Election districts acquired their first constitutional
recognition in 1838. They had, however, long been familiar to
our ordinary legislation. "When any township or townships hath
or have been divided, or hereafter shall be divided, in forming any
election district, an inspector shall be chosen for each district," said
the 7th section of the Act of 15th February, 1799 (3d Smith's
Laws 340), and since that time we have had innumerable Acts of
Assembly creating, dividing, and subdividing election districts,
until the Legislature grew tired of the subject, and in 1854, turned
it over to the Courts of Quarter Sessions, to fix election districts,
"so as to suit the convenience of the inhabitants thereof :" Purdon
1069. Always, from 1799 down to the present hour, election
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districts, within the meaning of our statutes, have denoted .subdivisions of Pennsylvania territory, marked out by known boundaries, prearranged 'and declared by public authority. Whether
composed, as at different periods they have been, of counties, or
cities, or townships, or boroughs, of wards, or of precincts, they
have always been such subdivisions of our own territory, and no
man has ever been known to suggest the formation of an election
district by Pennsylvania authority outside of her State borders.
Now, whilst the Constitution did not stop to define election districts,
it took up and incorporated them as the legislature had theretofore
or should thereafter define and regulate them. It referred itself
to the legislative will on the subject. And, therefore, election
districts mean in the Constitution just what they mean in the
statutes. This necessary dependence of constitutional principles
upon auxiliary legislation was explained in Maxwell's Case, 3 C.
444. We must understand the Constitution, then, as prescribing
to the qualified voter, that his ballot is to be cast in such an election district as the Legislature may erect by itself or through the
Courts. And the legislative power over election districts is unlimited within our own State. Whether they could form a district
beyond our territorial jurisdiction for the convenience of our own
citizens, is a question which need not be considered, for no such
legislation has been attempted. But it is quite clear to our minds
that the legislature might erect a military camp within the State
into an election district, and the moment they should do so the
Constitution would apply itself to that district in the same manner
as to any other.
But there must not only be a district to vote in, but there must
be a residence therein for ten days next preceding the election.
This is a part of the condition of suffrage. Undoubtedly the
primary signification of the word "residence," as used in the Constitution, is the same as domicil-a word which means the place
where a man establishes his abode, makes the seat of his property,
and exercises his civil and political rights, but I am not satisfied
that the Constitution meant to limit itself to this' strict and technical definition of residence. Referring the subject of election

CHASE Ts. MILLER.

districts to the legislature, as we have seen that it did, I incline
strongly to think that the Constitution meant, also, to leave the
subject of residence in an election district to legislative discretion,
and, therefore, that the Legislature are as free to declare what shall
be residence in an election district for ten days next preceding th6
election, as they are to prescribe the boundaries of the district.
When they have not exercised their power nor attached to the word
any other than its ordinary legal signification, it is to be received
according to its primary meaning in the Constitution, as equivalent
to domicil. But if they should make a military camp in Pennsylvania an election district, and declare that military sojourn and
service therein for ten days should be equivalent to a constitutional
residence for the purposes of election, I would be extremely loth to
think such a law unconstitutional. These observations, however,
on the meaning of the word residence, must not be considered as
expressing the opinion of the Court, but only m own.
The meaning of the constitutional clause under consideration
may, therefore, on the whole, be stated thus-every white freeman,
twenty-one years of age, having "resided" according to the
primary meaning of that word, or according to legislative definition of, it, in any "1election district" created by or under the
authority of the Legislature, for ten days preceding the election,
shall be permitted to offer his ballot in that district. "
Having now defined, with all possible clearness, the meaning we
attach to the clause of the Constitution in question, we turn next
to the consideration of the meaning of the 43d section of the Act
of 1839. Like all statutes, it is to be construed, it.possible, in a
manner that shall be consistent not only with the Constitution, but
with the other parts of the same statute. Neither unconstitutionality nor repugnancy are to be assumed, but, if both clearly appear,
we ought not to be expected to give the section effect.
The section says that the citizens referred to in its first clause

"may exercise the right of suffrage at such place as may be appointed by the commanding officer of the troop or company to
which they shall respectively belong."
Now we have seen above that the Constitution prescribes a place
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for the exercise of the right of suffrage, to wit, an election district.
The 43d section does not affect to create an election district. There
isnot a word in it for that purpose. There is no designation of
boundaries, no subdivision of territory, nothing, not a word cr
thought which bears the slightest relation to our legislation on the
subject of election districts. But it is said the place which the
commanding officer is authorized to appoint is the substantial
equivalent of an election district. Not so for many reasons,-for
these two particularly: 1st. There is no prior public designation
of the place. One purpose of having election districts designated
on some public record is, that all parties interested may know
where to resort to find the ballot-box. Some go there to voteothers to watch for illegal votes-others to electioneer, but all have
an interest in knowing where the law of the land has directed the
election to be held. The military commander makes no public
proclamation of the place he appoints, no record exists of his
appointment. 2d. A second and perfectly conclusive reason why
the place fixed by the commander cannot be regarded as an election
district is, that the legislature have no power to authorize a
military commander to make an election district. It is a part of
the civil administration-this designating of election districts-and
however it may be committed by one of the three co-ordinate
departments of the government to another of these departments,
as by the Legislature to the judiciary, no civil function of either
department can be delegated.to a military commander. This would
be to confound the first principles of the government. If the legislature had said in the most express terms that the commander
might declare his camp, wherever it might happen to be, an .election
district, it could -have availed nothing, for the Constitution, in
referring to the Legislature for election districts, recognised hem
as among the civil institutions of- the State, to be created and controlled exclusively by the civil, as contradistinguished from' the
military power of the State.' The Constitution says "the military
shall, in all cases and at all times, be in strict subordination to the
civil power," which is marking a distinction between the two
powers with great emphasis. To the civil and not to the military
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power did the Constitution intrust the formation of election districts, and therefore the civil cannot commit it to the military.
If then the legislature did not and could not authorize the military commander to form an election district, how could there be
any constitutional voting under the 43d section ? Without an election district there can be no constitutional voting. The 43d section
provides for no election district, and no military commander can be
empowered to form one-hence it follows, as an inevitable deduction, that the "place" referred to in that section is inconsistent
with the constitutional requisition of an election district, and that
whenever votes have been cast in pursuance of that section since
the Constitution of 1838 came in, they have been cast without
authority of law. If the place of voting has been, as in many
instances we know it has been, in other States, and in the District
of Columbia, the assumptions set up in behalf of it, have only been
the more extravagant. For, observef it has been assumed that the
Constitution was intended to have extra-territorial effect; next
that the Legislature had power to make election laws to be executed
not only in Pennsylvania but in other States also; then that the
43d section established election districts wherever a commander of
a troop or company should be pleased to appoint; and, finally, that
the presence of the soldier-voter at that place-though it might-be
on a forced march or in the tug of battle-was residence for ten
days within the meaning of the Constitution, no word of legislation
having ever said it should be so considered. Nay, not only had no
legislation authorized this last assumption, but this very 43d section
had excluded it, by declaring that the soldiers eititled to vote at
the place appointed by military commanders should be "qualified
citizens."
A constitutional argument which rests on such assumptions can
never be formidable. When a soldier returns to his election district, he resumes all the civil rights of citizenship, and his.residence
being unimpaired by his temporary absence, he has a right to vote
on election day, but under the Constitution, to which his fealty is
due, he can acquire no right to vote elsewhere, except by a change
of residence from one district to another.
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The repugnancy of the 49th section to other sections of the samestatute, is as gross as its inconsistency with the Constitution. It
says, the "citizens of this Commonwealth qualified as hereinbefore
provided," shall have the peculiar right of suffrage, which is claimed
in this case to be constitutional. This word "hereinbefore" is a
reference to prior sections of the same statute, but the qualifications
for suffrage are not contained in any prior section-another instance
of careless legislation. It is not till we get to the 63d section that
we come to the subject of qualifications. The 68d section re-enacts
the 1st section of the 3d article of the Constitution in terms. If
we read the word hereinbefore as if it were written hereinafter, or if
we construe it as referring to the constitutional clause of qualification
(and in one or the other of these ways it must be taken), it comes to
the same thing-a demand for the constitutional qualificationsof
suffrage in every soldier who claims to vote under the 43d section.
It says in effect, that the soldiers who offer to vote in the election
district wherein they hdve resided ten days immediately preceding
the election, shall be entitled to vote in any place their commander
appoints, provided it be not within ten miles of the district wherein
thy have resided for the last ten days-which is downright nonsense. Set such is the effect of the words "qualified as hereinbefore provided," when taken in connection with the other parts of
the section-they turn the whole section into jargon.
The 63d section declares, that "no person shall be permitted fo
vote at any election" provided for by the Act, except he possess
the constitutional qualifications which have been already expounded.
The 67th section declares that every person qualified as aforesaid
"C
shall be admitted to vote in the township, ward, or district in
which he shall reside," and the resolution of 26th April, 1844, put
down in Purdon as section 48 of the Act, provides for a person-who
removes from one ward, borough, or township to another within ten
days before the election, and gives him a right to vote in the ward,
borough, or township from which he has removed. These legislative regulations of residence in districts are in accordance with that
interpretation of the Constitution suggested above, and show clearly
how essentially the place of vcting has entered into the qualifici-
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tions of suffrage. The negative words of the 63d, and the affirmative words of the 67th, are very emphatic expressions of the eonstitutional rule in respect to the place of voting.
Whilst speaking of the legislative control of election districts, ii
may be proper to advert to a fact, stated in argument, that voters
resident in the township of Wilkesbarre, which is an election district, are accustomed to vote in the borough of Wilkesbarre, which
is a separate election district, and other similar instances are said
to exist in Luzerne county, and in other parts of the State, where
votes are actually cast in an election district adjacent to that in
which the voters reside. If this practice have the sanction of
an Act of Assembly it is defensible; if it have not, I know of no
principle on which it can be excused except that of communis error.
And this is all that we feel called on to say ii regard to it, for it
is not a circumstance of sufficient magnitude or importance to disturb the course of our argument, or to attract further notice.
To all these sections the 43d, as construed in the Court below, is
directly repugnant. It is repugnant also to all those numerous
provisions of the Act which require peace officers on demand of an
election officer, or of three citizens, to preserve free access to the
polls, and to suppress disturbances and riot-which forbid wagering
and misconduct at the polls, and which prohibit all troops, "either
armed or unarmed," from attending at any place of election within
the Commonwealth.
The 43d section is in direct antagonism to all of these reasonable
and conservative provisions. It permits the ballot-box, according
to the Court below, to be opened anywhere, within or without our
State, with no other guards than such as commanding officers, who
may not themselves be voters, nor subject to our jurisdiction, may
choose to throw around it-and it invites soldiers to vote where the
evidence of their qualifications is not at hand; and where our civil
police cannot attend to protect the legal voter, to repel the rioter,
and to guard the ballots after they have been cast.
It is scarcely possible to conceive of any provision and practice
that could, at so many points, offend the cherished policy of Pennsylvania in respect to suffrage. Our Constitution and laws treat
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the elective franchise as a sacred trust, committed only to that portion of the citizens who come up to the prescribed- standards of
qualification, and to be exercised by them at the time and place
and in the manner pre-arranged by public law and proclamationsand whilst being exercised, to be guarded, down to the instant-of
its final consummation, by magistrates and constables, and by oaths
and penalties. All of which the 43d section reverses and disregards, and opens a wide door for most odious frauds, some of which
have come under our judicial cognisance. It is due to our citizen
soldiery to add, however, in respect to the cases of fraud that have
been before us, that no soldier was implicated. The frauds were
perpetrated, in every instance, by political speculators, who prowled
about the military camps watching for opportunities to destroy true
ballots and substitute false ones, to forge and falsify returns, and
to cheat citizen and soldier alike out of the fair and equal election
provided for by law. And this is the great vice of the 43d section
-that it creates the occasion and furnishes the opportunity for
such abominable practices. This would be a reason, drawn from
our experience of the last half year, for construing it strictly, if
strict construction were required. But it is so palpably in conflict
with the Constitution, and so repugnant to all the substantial parts
of the enactment into which it was heedlessly thrust, that no strictness of construction is called for. Taking the section as it stands
-as every reader, whether clerk or layman, would understand it,
or as the learned Judge below administered it, we hold it to be sabversive of the amended clause of article 3d of the Constitution, and
also of the constitutional sections of the general election law of 2d
July, 1839.
Having now examined fully the grounds and extent of our jurisdiction, and having stated the meaning of both the constitutional
amendment and the enactment in question, and thus developed the
irreconcilable antagonism between them, it remains only that we
notice, briefly, some of the most prominent arguments that have
been urged in support of the enactment. The learned Judge refers
himself to several cases, in which this Court have set up judicial
implications as to the spirit and meaning of the Constitutiont, in
VOL. XI.-11
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order to support Acts of Assembly that were inconsistent with the
letter of the Constitution, but he failed to observe that, in all these
cases, there was ground laid in the Constitutionitself to support the
judicial implication. Take for example the Acts of Assembly tha.
were discussed in Zeplion's Case, 7 W. & S. 68, Kilpatrick'8 Case,
7 C. 178, and Foust's Case, 9 C. 340, all of which were supposed
to conflict With that provision of the Constitution which requires
the President Judge of the Common Pleas to be one of the quorum
of the Court of Oyer and Terminer. Everybody knows that the
Constitution betrayed an anxiety that the trial of high crimes
should be presided over by a Judge " learned in the law," and as
it provided for no such Judges, except in the instance of the President of the Common Pleas, it, therefore, required him to be present
in the Court of highest criminal jurisdiction. But when the Legislature provided associate Judges "learned in the law," for certain
Courts of Common Pleas, everybody saw how the overruling purpose of the Constitution would be just as well carried out by allowing such associates to constitute the Oyer and Terminer, as by
requiring the President Judge to be always present. Founding the
judicial implication on the manifest intent and purpose of the Constitution, the Acts of Assembly were held constitutional.
So, in the instance discussed in Maxwell's Case, 8 C. 444, the
choice of judges by popular election was seen to be .the policy and
purpose of the Constitution, but the Constitution could not regulate
the details of such an election, and therefore referred them to the
Legislature to regulate. The Legislature, considering that three
months was none too much time for the people tb look up a good
judge, provided that if a vacancy occurred in less than that time
before the annual general election, the choice should be postponed
till the general election of the next year-the vacancy being filled,
meantime, by Executive appointment. We held .the Act of Assembly constitutional, because it aimed at the accomplishment of one
of the great and apparent purposes of the Constitution. We
could not consider the interval of three months unreasonable,
because it was the very period which the Constitution itself fixed
for the election of a Governor when a vacancy happened in that
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office in the midst of an official term. Thus the grounds of the
judicial implication set up in supnort of the law were derived from
the Constitution itself. The same line of remark might be applied
to most, perhaps all, of the other cases cited.
But how can it be applied to this case? In what part of the
Constitution does it betray the purpose, policy, or desire, that votes
should be cast wherever qualified citizens may happen to be on
election day? So far from affording any ground for judicial implications of this kind, it studiously excludes them by prescribing
the terms of suffrage with as much precision as we would look for
in a treatise on mathematics. It does not deal with suffrage carelessly. It withholds it altogether from about four-fifths of the
population, however much property they may have to be taxed, or
however competent in respect of prudence and patriotism, many of
them be to vote. And here let it be remarked, that all our successive fundamental laws have grown more and more astute on this
subject. Penn's frame of government, made in April, 1682, gave
the right of suffrage to "every freeman of the province ;" his laws,
agreed upon in England in May, 1682, gave it to every inhabitant
of the province who should purchase a hundred acres of land, or
who shall have paid his passage, and taken up a hundred acres of
land at a penny an acre, and cultivated ten acres thereof; and to
every person that bath been a servant or bondsman, and is free by
his service, that shall have taken up fifty acres, and cultivated
twenty, and to every resident of the province that pays scot and
lot to the government. By the Constitution of 1776, every freeman, of twenty-one years of age, having resided in the State one
year next before the election, and paid public taxes during that
time, was entitled to vote.
Here we see the definition of a voter growing more exact, and
in the Constitution of 1790 still more exact, and, finally, in that
of 1838, he is to superadd to the other distinguishing marks, a district residence of ten days immediately preceding the election. Now
the labor of the Constitution has not been to restrict suffrage in
any spirit of distrust of popular intelligence, but it has been to
define it so exactly that it might be preserved from abuse and per-
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version. The Constitution affords ample ground for judicial im
plications in favor of legislation that tends to ascertain legal voters
and votes with precision and exactitude, but not an atom of ground
for implications in behalf of a law that opens the ballot-box anywhere and everywhere, under supervision of military officers wholly
unknown to our civil administration, and where no officer can possibly be who is specially charged with the supervision of State
elections. Because judicial implications have been set up in behalf
of other Acts of Assembly, it does not follow that judicial implications can save this one. In other instances the implication was
well grounded in the Constitution-in this instance everything in
the implication.
the Constitution forbids
The learned Judge deprecates a construction that shall disfranchise our volunteer soldiers. It strikes us that this is an inaccurate
use of language. The Constitution would disfranchise no qualified
voter. • But, to secure purity of election, it would have its voters
in the place where they are best known on election day. If a voter
voluntarily stays at home or goes a journey, or joins the army of
his country, can it be said that the Constitution has disfranchised
him ? Four of the Judges of this Court, living in other parts of
the State, find themselves, on the day of every presidential election,
in the city of Pittsburgh, where their official duties take them and
where they are not permitted to vote. Have they a right to charge
the Constitution with disfranchising them ? Is not the truth rather
this-that they have voluntarily assumed duties that are inconsistent
with the right of suffrage for the time being ? Such is our case,
and such is the case of the volunteers in the army. , The right of
suffrage is carefully preserved for both them and us, to be enjoyed
when we return to the places which the Constitution has appointed
for its exercise. It is forcing a gratuitous assumption upon the
Constitution to treat it as intending that the volunteer in the public
service, shall carry his elective franchise with him wherever his
duties require him to go. There is no word or syllable in the
instrument to justify the assumption.
A good deal has been said about the hardship of depriving so
meritorious a class of voters as our volunteer soldiers of the right
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of voting. As a Court of justice we cannot feel the force of any
such consideration. Our business is to expound the Constitution
and laws of the country as we find, them written. We have no
bounties to grant to soldiers, or anybody else. It may be said,
however, in answer to this suggestion, that the hardship of missing
an annual election is one of the least the poldier is called on to
endure, and this they share in common with the patriot soldiers of
all the loyal States, for it is understood that no State but Pennsylvania has attempted to extend civil suffrage to an army in the
field. To voluntarily surrender the comforts of home, and friends,
and business, and to encounter the privations of the camp and the
perils of war, for the purpose of vindicating the Constitution and
laws of the country, is indeed a signal sacrifice to make for the
public good, but the men who make it most cheerfully and from
the highest motives, would be the very last to insist, weakly, on
carrying with them the right of civil suffrage, especially when they
see, what experience pioves, that it cannot be exercised amidst the
tumults of war without being attended with fraudulent practices
that endanger the very existence of the right. Whilst such men
fight for the Constitution, they do not expect judges to sap and
mine it by judicial constructions.
Finally, let it be said that we do not look upon the construction
we have given the constitutional amendment as stringent, harsh, or
technical. On the contrary, we consider it the natural and obvious
reading of the instrument, such as the million would instinctively
adopt. Constitutions, above all other documents, are to be read as
they are written. Judicial glosses and refinements are misplaced
when laid upon them. Carefully considered judicial implications
may indeed be made from them in support of statutes-never to
defeat statutes-when such implications are grounded in the Constitution itself, and tend to accomplish its obvious purposes, as .well ab
to promote the public welfare. But when asked to set up a construction that opposes itself io both the letter and the spirit of the
instrument, and which tends to the destruction of one of our fundamental political rights-that free and honest suffrage on whicn all
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our institutions are built-this Court must say, in fidelity to the
oaths it has sworn, that it cannot be done.
DECREE OF THE COURT.-And now, to wit: May 22d, 1862,
this cause having been argued by counsel, and fully considered by
the Court, the motion made on behalf of the contestants to quash
the certiorari is overruled and dismissed, and it is ordered and
adjudged that the decree of the Court of Quarter Sessions of the
county of Luzerne, made on the sixth day of January, 1862, be
reversed, annulled, and taken for nought, and it is here determined
and decreed, that the election and return of Ezra B. Chase to the
office of District Attorney in and for the said county of Luzerne,
at the general election on the second Tuesday of October last, was
not undue or false, as charged by said contestants, but that the
said Ezra B. Chase was -duly elected to said office, and is entitled,
upon taking the proper oath, to all the rights, privileges, and
emoluments thereof.
It is further considered and certified, that the complaint of said
contestants was not without probable cause, and it is therefore
decreed, that the county of Luzerne pay the costs of this contested
election.
LOWRIE, C. J., took no part in the decision, having been absent
at the time of the argument, on account of death in his family.
THOMPSON, J., dissenting.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.-At Nisi Priui, in Equity.
November Term, 1862.
Before Justices THOMPSON and WOODWARD.
WILLIAM P. DENNIS vs. HENRY ECHARDT.

Where a lawful 1'usiness, such as that of tinsmith and sheet-iron worker, is carried
on at unseasonable hours to the annoyance and discomfort of neighbors, and
until it becomes a nuisance, equity will interfere by injunction to restrain it.

Motion for special injunction.
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Peter McCall, Esq., appeared for complainant. The defendant
was not represented either in person or by counsel.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Tno xPsON, J.-It is essential in all civilized communities that
the individual dominion of property should be sedulously restrained
within the principle that each owner should so use it as not to,
injure his neighbor, c,Sic utere tuo ut alienam non lcedes." The
principle is necessary to preserve the safety and health, as well as
morality, of the people, and hence a power must exist somewhere
to enforce it. If this were not so, unwholesome establishments,
filthy styes, and distracting machinery might and would be erected
at the very doors of private dwellings, to the destruction of all
peace, health, and comfort of the inmates. A community in which
such privileges should exist could not long exist as civilized.
The Courts, through the medium of their common law forms,
can only act indirectly for the suppression of such evils by the imposition of damages for injuries already done, leaving, of course,
the cause still in existence. No one can well doubt that where
there is a case for damages the establishment is a nuisance; and
all will readily agree that to leave it in full operation to breed disease, as well as future lawsuits, is to have attempted redress by a
very inadequate remedy.
The case in hand is the shop of a tinsmith and sheet-iron worker,
who, it seems, has erected his shop, a very thin, loose building of
boards, some eight feet from the back building and sleeping-rooms
of the complainant, and there carries on work, generally beginning
in the morning before or by daylight, and resuming it again in the
evening at or about 8 o'clock P.)., and keeping it up till 11
o'clock at night, having generally employment elsewhere during
the day. The noise of the hammering and pounding in .lci an
establishment, we well know, is usually very great, and the affi.
davits describe it as intolerable in this instance. so uiuch :-othat
the complainant and his fainily can scarcely hen, ;ich other con
verse; have been obliged! to nbaiod,n their ehalib(: ne.xt to the
shop, and are every night -nvl morning deprivedl of thcir rv.st by
the persistent hanneriog of the dIMf0idant.

DENNIS vs. ECHARDT.

The complainant alleges that he has appealed in vain to him t.
abstain from his disturbing noises in the mornings and evenings;
that, although sickness and death were in the house, he has disregarded his appeals. So, too, he disregarded the notice of an
intended application for a special injunction given to him in this
case, and leaves us without explanation of his conduct or denial of
the facts alleged. Taking, then, these facts before us as true-for
no one disputes them-can he be restrained from the exercise of
his trade on his own premises, although it be noisy?
I will, at this time, only examine the main questions of law involved in this case, so far as may be necessary to an understanding
of the decision which may be made under the present aspect of the
case.
The first thing to be thought of is, whether.any decree, preliminary or otherwise, can be made without a trial at common law, and
a verdict settling the fact of a nuisance on account of the manner
in which the defendant carries on his business. The object of a
trial we may remember, however, is to settle the right where it is
in dispute, but we have, at this moment at least, no disputed fact
before us. The defendant interposes neither fact nor argument
against the present motion, and we are to decide on the case before
us on the sufficiency of the facts to establish the ground of complaint-viz., that the noises emanating from the defendant's. shop,
at unseasonable hours especially, and at all hours; is z nuisance.
That the affidavits establish this I have no doubt, and also that
these noises are a nuisance, if a nuisance can be created by such
means.
The business of a tin and sheet-iron manufacturer is lawful; his
shop is not a nuisance per 8e. This must be conceded. If it were,
no doubt could exist in regard to the remedy by injunction.
Wherein consists the difference between a nuisance per se and
where a lawful pursuit is so carried on as to become a nuisance?
It is not, I apprehend, in the remedy, but only in the proof of it.
That once established, either by non-denial, trial at law, or otherwise, it falls into the same current of remedy in chancery as if it
were a nuisance per se. We have many cases in the books, English
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and American, of recoveries against lawful establishments, manufactories and the like, on account of annoyances from noises,- &c.
Such recovery could only be had on the ground of nuisance. In
Gill vs. Bradley, 1 Lutwytch 29, was a recovery against a blacksmith on account of the noises ineident to his business. llumford
and Others vs. The Wolverhampton Railway Company, I Hurl. &
Norm. 34, was on account of a steam-boiler shop.
In Davidson vs. _Tshanz, 1 Stock. R. 186, Chancellor WILLIA31SON expressed freely his opinion as to noises from manufacturing
establishments and shops in the heart of a city becoming private
nuisances, and liable to be restrained and controlled by proceedings in Chancery. .Fish vs. Dodge, 4 Denio 311, was a case
against a steam-engine factory, and it was fully agreed that a recovery might be had on account of noises. So in Dargan vs.
Waddell, 9 Iredell, N. C. Rep. 244, damages were allowed against
the owner of a stable on account of the noise made by horses
stamping in the night4ime. These cases suffice to show that there
is no exemption because the business may be lawful, if its exercise
works harm or injury to others.
We have often held that repeated acts of trespass amounting to
a nuisance as to a private right, may be enjoined in Pennsylvania.
Scheetz's Appeal, 11 Casey 88, and cases there cited.
But this is only when there is no adequate remedy at law. I
cannot doubt that a constant annoyance, which at law cannot be
abated, is never remedied by damages. The loss of health and
sleep, the enjoyment of quiet and repose, and the comforts of
home, cannot be restored or compensated in money ; it may afford
consolation, but it does not remedy the evil, if that goes on, to be
paid for by instalments. The law operates on the past only, while
equity can and will act on the present and the future, will abate
the nuisance itself, and restore the injured party to his rights. In
this case a suit or suits would not be an adequate remedy for the
evils complained of, in my opinion.
But we should not interfere by preliminary injunction, except
in cases of irreparable mischief or injury. I~vo we not such a
case here? It may be asked if the mischief is not irreparable
which entails the want of health as a consequence of annoyances.
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A chancellor does not wait till noisome trades and unwholesome
gases kill somebody before he proceeds to restrain ; or that the
threatened destruction of pictures, eharts, &c., has taken place.
His remedy is preventive, and if the tendency of the acts complained of be injurious, so that the injury may be irreparable, he
will proceed to prevent them.
Dr. Spencer states his experience of the noises from the defendant's shop, while attending the plaintiff's family, and declares his
belief that it greatly interfered with his efforts to relieve his
patients, and he gives his belief that it would jeopard the life of a
patient, in the crisis of a fever, by preventing rest and sleep. I
do not forget the admonition against using the strong arm of the
chancellor, but that strength was given, and intended to be used,
in proper cases, and I think this is one of them as it now stands
before us. What ihay be made to appear on answer, pleadings,
and proofs, if the case comes to that, I do not anticipate nor prejudge ; it is of the case, as it is now, that I treat. I am, therefore, of opinion that the defendant should be restrained from using
his tin and sheet-iron workshop, as a workshop, until further order
of the Court. Let the decree for a preliminary injunction be
drawn and entered on the plaintiff's giving bond, with sufficient
sureties, in $1000 to the defendant, conditioned to answer in
damages, in case of loss by reason of this injunction-

Supreme Court of Indiana, November Term, 1862.
JOHN ROCHE vs. FRANCIS WASHINGTON.*
Since the removal of the Miami Tribe of Indians from Indiana, in pursuance of
their treaty with the United States in 1840, a marriage between two remaining
members of the tribe, according to the native customs, will be held invalid in
the courts of Indiana, as contrary to the laws of that State.
Qu. Whether the Indian tribes within the United States are in any case independent civilized nations, so as to require their marriage laws or customs to be
recognised in the State Courts.

PERKINS, J.-Suit for partition instituted by Francis Washington
We are indebted for this case to the kindness of PERKINS, J.

ROCHE

vs.

WASHIINGTON.

against John Roche. Partition adjudged. Motion for a new trial
overruled: commissioners report partition : report conirmed. New
trial denied. Appeal to this Court.
The cause was decided upon the following agreed case:" It is hereby agreed by the parties to this action, that the foIlowing are the facts of the case. The land in question, of which
partition is prayed, was the property of Sa-ka-ko-quak, alias Jane
Richardville, who died seised of the same in 1857, leaving no children, no father nor mother, but leaving her husband, as hereinafter
stated, whose name is George Washington, and her sister Catharine
Richardville, her brother Suab Richardville, and Francis Washington, the plaintiff, who is an only son of her sister Ah-tah-fe-tah-neah,
deceased. It is further agreed that the defendant John Roche has
the title of George Washington, Catharine, and Suab Richardville,
conveyed to him since the decease of the said Jane Richardville.
It is further agreed that all of the foregoing persons, except the
defendant, are or were'-Miami Indians.
"It is further agreed, that in the year 1844 the said George
Washington, according to the manner and custom of marriage in
said Miami tribe of Indians, was duly married to Se-qua, a Miami
Indian, with whom he lived, residing in Huntington county, Indiana,
where a portion of the said Miami tribe then and since have resided. That in the year 1846 the said George Washington, and
the said Se-qua, according to the manner and custom of divorce in
said Miami tribe, were duly divorced. That in the same year 1846
said Se-qua removed to Kansas Territory, where she has since resided and now resides. That afterwards, in the year 1847, said
George Washington, according to the custom of said tribe, of Indians, was married to the said Ah-tah-fe-tah-neah, who departed
this life in 1852, leaving said Francis Washington her only surviving child. That afterwards in 1853, said George Washiagton,
according to the custom of said Indian tribe, was married to said
Sa-ka-ko-quak, alias Jane Richardville, and that the two lived
together and cohabited as man and wife till her death, at the county
of Ituntington, in 1857, she dying childless.
"It is further agreed, that the Indian custom of marriage re-
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quires no ceremony, further than the agreement of the parties to
live together as husband and wife, the agreement being consummated
by living and cohabiting together as such.
"It is further agreed, that the Indian custom of divorces requires
no special form of proceeding other than that the parties disagree,
and by consent separate, the mother usually taking care of, and
receiving the annual payment of the government to the children;
and that the said customs of marriage and divorce are the ancient,
immemorially continued, and present existing customs among all of
said tribe of Indians, and the law thereof, and that the same have
continued to exist as their customs and laws for a period beyond the
memory of man."
"J. R. COFFROTH, Att'y for defendants.
(Signed,)
S. P. MILLIGAN, Att'y for plaintiffs."
The question intended to be presented for our decision in this
cause is, whether the Courts of Indiana will hold valid as marriages
such unions, and as divorces such separations as those described in
the agreed statement of facts, they having been made under, and
being sanctioned by the laws of the Miami tribe of Indians.
It is claimed that by the law of nations, the Courts of Indiana
must uphold Indian marriages. The law of nations or international
law is mainly of modern origin, growing out of increased commercial and social intercourse, and exists only among civilized States:
I Kent's Comm. p. 1. .It is very properly divided by late writers
into public and private. Public, that which regulates the political
interclOtrse of nations with each other. Private, that which regulates the comity df States in giving effect in one to the municipal
laws of another relating to private persons, their contracts, &c.
The first question to be decided is, then, does a tribe of North
American Indians constitute a State? We think not. A State
has been defined to be "a people permanently occupying a fixed
territory, bound together by common laws, habits, and customs (or
by a constitution), into one body politic, exercising through the
medium of an organized government, independent sovereignty and
control over all persons and things within its boundaries, capable
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of making war and peace, and of entering intu international relations with other communities." See Tew'American Cyclopedia,
vol. 10, p. 860; Wheaton's Law of Nations, pp. 53, 54; 1 Kent's
Comm. p. 188, 189. But few of the particulars enumerated as
constituting a State exist in a tribe of North American Indians.
(See, however, the Cherokee .Nation vs. Georgia, 6 Pet. U. S. Rep.
1.) This the Court judicially takes notice of as a matter of general
historical knowledge. The Indians are not elevated above the condition of nomadic, pastoral tribes, if up to it. Neither, were these
tribes conceded to be States or nations in the political or international sense of the term, are they civilized.
Civilization, it is true, is a term which covers several states of
society: it is relative and has not a fixed sense; but in all its
applications it is limited to a state of society above that existing
among the Indians of whom we are speaking. It implies an improved and progressive condition of the people, living under an
organized government; with systematized labor, individual ownership of the soil, individual accumulations of property, humane and
somewhat cultivated manners and customs, the institution of the
family, with well defined and respected domestic and social relations, institutions of learning, intellectual activity, &c. We know
historically that the North American Indians are classed as savages
and not as civilized peoples, and that, in fact, it is problematical
whether they are susceptible of civilization.
But let it be admitted that the Miami tribe of Indians constitutes
an international political state, and that it is a civilized one, still
the State of Indiana is not bound by international comity to give
effect in her Courts to all the laws and customs of such St4tc: but
only to such as are not repugnant to her own laws and policy: Doe
vs. Collins, 1 Ind. 24. Laws, giving effect to contracts of marriage, are not repugnant to the laws or policy of Indiana: and the
proposition is established as a general one, in private international
law, that an actual marriage; valid in the country where celebrated,
will, not as upon a claim of right, but by courtesy, be given effect
to in other States, though not celebrated by the forms nor evidenced
in the mode prescribed for marriages in such other States. If,
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then, in the case at bar, an actual marriage took place betweeu
Jane Richardville and George Washington, there could be no objection to its being upheld in the Courts of this State, though celebrated among an uncivilized tribe of Indians.
What, then, constitutes the thing called marriage? What is it in
the eye of the jue gentium P It is the union of one man and one
woman "so long as they both shall live," to the exclusion of all
others, by an obligation which, during that time, the parties cannot, of their own volition and act dissolve, but which can be dissolved only by authority of the State. Nothing short of this is a
marriage. And nothing short of this is meant, when it is said that
marriages, valid where made, will be upheld in other States: Noel
vs. Ewing, 9 Ind 37; Story's Conflict of Laws, chap. 5; Wheaton's Law of Nations 137: see Reynolds vs. Reynolds, 3 Allen
(Mass.) Rep. p. 605. From what has been said, it is manifest that
the union between Jane and George, described in the statement of
facts in the case at bar, was not a marriage according to the law
of any civilized nation, but simply and exactly a contract and state
of concubinage: See Cobb on Slavery 245, note 4: The State vs.
Samuel, 2 Dev. & Bat. (N. C. Rep.) 177.
But, suppose the union had been such as to constitute a marriage
according to the Jus gentium, and which the Courts of this State
would have upheld as such, it might not still have followed as a
consequence that the husband would have inherited from the wife
her real estate. The marriage is one thing, and the incidents, the
legal rights and consequences attaching upon the marriage, are
another: and these may be different as to real and personal property: 2 Kent, p. 93, et seq. -Marriage, in different countries, is
followed by different property rights. In the Miami nation, or
tribe of Indians, marriage, supposing we concede their unions of
the sexes to be such, is not followed by a right in either party by
*the law of the tribe, to inherit real estate from the other; for the
Indians, by their laws, neither in their tribal capacities nor individually, owned any real estate. It is a kind of property unknown
to them. They simply hold vaguely defined territory for use in
hunting, fishing, &c.; and they never assumed to, and could not
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convey the fee to any one. That belonged first to Great Britain,
as the discovering nation, and to the United States afterwards, by
succession to Great Britain: and it is under our laws only that any
individual among the Indians ever obtained, conveyed, or inherited
real estate: See Fellows vs. Denniston, 23 New York Rep. 420;
The Cherokee -Nationvs. Georgia, 5 Peters.(U. S.) Rep. I. This
is the doctrine of international law held by civilized States, and
acted upon without consulting the Indians. It is based or justified
on the ground that the Indians never cultivated the soil.
But the case does not turn on any of the foregoing points, and
they need not therefore be regarded as decided. See, on the general subject, DTole vs. Irish, 2 Barb. 639; Wall vs. Williamson, 8
Ala. 48; 11 Id. 828, and 10 Id. 630. Also Jones vs. Laney, 2
Texas 342, and the cases in the Supreme Court of the U. S., cited
in Curtis's Digest 240.
A treaty, however, we may remark, may be made between a
government and an association of persons not constituting an independent government. The Constitution of the United States
authorizes our government to treat with foreign nations, and to
regulate affairs with States and Indian tribes.
We know, as a part of the law of the land, and the history of
our State, that the last treaty between the Miami tribe of Indians
located in Indiana and the United States, was in 1840: that this
tribe then agreed to remove from Indiana to west of the Mississippi
River: that in 1846 the agreement was executed, the chiefs at
that time relinquishing their council fires upon the Wabash, and,
accompanied by most of the living members of their tribe, departed
for their newly-assigned and distant home. The sovereignty, of the
tribe, so far as it possessed sovereignty, its jurisdictional power, so
far as it possessed such over persons and property in Indiana, disappeared with the light of its council fires, and departed to the new
seat of the tribe. Now it is true, as a general proposition, that the
laws of a nation are operative only within the limits of the territory over which the jurisdiction of the nation extends. They do
not, as a general proposition, follow the individuals of such nation,
into the jurisdictional limits of another nation, so as to attach to

